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“Screening” New York’s New
Rules—Laterals Remain
Conflicted Out
Fallyn B. Reichert*
I. Introduction
You happened to be one of the lucky attorneys who got
hired at a big New York City law firm before the economic
crisis, but recently found yourself among the many that are
laid off and looking for a new job at another firm. A potential
employer is interested, but after submitting the vast list of
cases and clients that you have actively worked on, it declines
to hire you because of a conflict of interest that it is unwilling
to risk. This problem is real and alive more today than ever
before. New York failed to address this problem in its recently
adopted ethics rules that do not include a provision allowing for
the use of screens for laterally moving attorneys.
Unfortunately, this leaves the state‟s law firms and courts with
no clear standard to follow and hampers the mobility of lateral
moving attorneys in an already depressed economy.
Amidst the excitement of the news that New York finally
decided to join the forty-eight other states that had already
adopted the format of the American Bar Association‟s (ABA)
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,1 a close look revealed
that, while the new Rules reflect a change in format, they are
substantively not much different from the old Code.2 New
* J.D., Pace University School of Law (expected May 2011); B.S. Hilbert
College (2006). The Author would like to thank Professor Gary Munneke for
his insight in this area, Matthew Collibee for his editing assistance, and Kyle
Cavalieri for all of his support.
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT Preface (2009) (“[T]he American
Bar Association has provided leadership in legal ethics and professional
responsibility through the adoption of professional standards that serve as
models of the regulatory law governing the legal profession.”).
2. Joan C. Rogers, New York Adopts Format of Model Rules, But Keeps
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York‟s Rules are missing a few key provisions from the Model
Rules, including one that allows laterally moving attorneys to
be screened to avoid imputed disqualification. This provision is
essential to attorneys changing employers in this economy.
The legal profession and attorneys are not exempt from
today‟s economy; the unemployment rates in Professional and
Business Services are over ten percent.3 At a time when law
firms are laying off lawyers, reducing partner pay, and
deferring hiring due to the economy,4 it would be ideal to
implement a lateral screening provision, eliminating one less
burden for attorneys. Any restrictions on mobility under these
current economic challenges, where a substantial number of
lateral attorney moves are involuntary, are going to be
extremely detrimental to the lawyer. In the United States,
during the first three months of 2009, “more than 3,000
lawyers lost their jobs due to downsizing and layoffs.”5 This
news came following a sixty-six percent increase to a new tenyear high of twenty thousand unemployed lawyers in 2008.6
Even before the economic downturn, the rate of mobility among
young lawyers was high, with fifty-three percent of lawyers
changing practice settings between their second and seventh
year of practice (2002 and 2007, respectively).7 “Regardless of
whether lawyers move between private firms voluntarily or
Much From Code and Omits MJP, 24 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF.
CONDUCT 666, Dec. 24, 2008.
3. As of December 2009, the unemployment rate for Professional and
Business Services was 10.3 percent. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ECONOMIC
NEWS RELEASE; TABLE A-14: UNEMPLOYED PERSONS BY INDUSTRY AND CLASS OF
WORKER,
NOT
SEASONALLY
ADJUSTED,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t14.htm (last modified Oct. 8, 2010).
4. See Cynthia Cotts, DLA Piper Lawyer Trades Big-Firm Perks for
Boutique,
BLOOMBERG,
July
31,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aqoEl_lhilg8.
5. Cassandra Melton, Model Rule 1.10: Imputation of Conflicts and
Private Law Firm Screening, PP&D (Sec. of Litig., A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), Fall
2009,
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/pretrial-modelrule-110.html [hereinafter Melton, Imputation of Conflicts].
6. Id.
7. Seven Years into a Lawyer’s Career, RESEARCHING LAW: AN ABF
UPDATE (Am. B. Found., Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2009, at 3. When asked about
their plans for the future, 32.7 percent of young lawyers reported that they
planned to change practice settings within the next two years. Id.
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involuntarily, such lawyers bring potential conflicts into new
firms that hire them, which could disqualify entire law firms
from representing clients. This increased movement
underscores the need for a rule that reflects the realities of
modern practice.”8 Unfortunately, New York‟s new Rules did
not come equipped with a screening provision to aid laterally
moving private attorneys in this regard.
New York is not the only state struggling with the issue of
lateral screening; the ABA just recently changed Model Rule
1.10 to allow screening after numerous failed proposals.9 The
ABA has been criticized for its stalled action in changing the
rule to allow for screening in order to reflect the current status
of the legal profession.10 At the time of the ABA‟s amendment,
twenty-four states already had some form of lateral screening
provision in place.11 Amended ABA Model Rule 1.10 allows for
screening of a laterally-moving lawyer as long as the
disqualified lawyer has no part in the matter, is given no part
of the fee,12 and the affected former client is given prompt
8. Melton, Imputation of Conflicts, supra note 5.
9. The first proposal was submitted by the Ethics 2000 Committee in
2002 and was rejected by a vote of 176-130. Robert Mundheim, General
Information Form, in A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, REP.
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 109, at 18 (2009),
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/109.pdf.
Then again in 2008, a similar recommendation was made to the House of
Delegates who voted to postpone consideration of the Recommendation by a
vote of 192-191. Id. Rule 1.10 was finally amended in February of 2009 by a
vote of 226-191. Edward A. Adams, ABA House OKs Lateral Lawyer Ethics
Rule
Change,
A.B.A.
J.
(Feb.
16,
2009,
4:04
PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_house_oks_lateral_lawyer_ethic
s_rule_change/.
10. See T. MAXFIELD BAHNER, A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L
RESPONSIBILITY, IT‟S TIME FOR THE ABA TO HAVE A SCREENING RULE (2009),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/bahner.pdf.
“Our
„Model‟
Rules
of
Professional Conduct are intended to be just that: a trusted model that the
states of the union can follow in crafting their own rules of professional
conduct.” Id.
11. A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, LATERAL LAWYER
SCREENING STATUS (2009), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/screen-status.pdf.
12. Some states have removed the prohibition on fee sharing allowing
the disqualified lawyer to receive a normal salary or distribution, including a
part of the fee from the screened matter, stating that “attempting to preclude
fee sharing . . . is impractical, particularly in large firms.” Douglas J.
Brocker, The Expansion of Attorney Conflict Screening, N.C. ST. B.J.,
http://www.ncbar.gov/ethics/eth_articles_8,4.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
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written notice and certifications of compliance.13
This Article offers a brief introduction on the use of
screening and discusses the main arguments for and against
allowing
non-consensual
lateral
screening,
including
identification of the multiple situations where the New York
Rules currently allow screening and discusses the evolution of
screening through decisions from the state and federal courts
deciding on motions to disqualify counsel (commonly favoring
screening over imputed disqualification). The Article then
addresses the trend in the legal profession towards uniform
ethics standards through the teaching and examination of law
students on the Model Rules. Finally, this Article recommends
that New York adopt a provision in Rule 1.10 allowing lateral
screening, similar to that of the Model Rules, setting forth key
factors and definitions to be considered and included in the
updated Rule.
II. Screening—the What, Why, and How
Generally, when evaluating a lateral hire, the hiring firm
will generate a list of the current matters that it has against
the prospective employee‟s old firm, and will consult with each
lawyer regarding any matter that might be adverse.14 Before
making an offer of employment, a firm will ask a candidate to
supply a list of the clients and cases that she has worked on
(noting whether the clients will also be coming to the firm) or
was substantially involved in (where it is foreseeable that the
client might object to the new firm taking an adverse position
to them).15 The new firm should cross-check the candidate‟s list
against their own database, as well as require each lawyer of
the firm to check the list for any potential conflicts.16 Often,
lateral hires will be abandoned because the conflicts of interest
are too problematic.17
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a)(2)(i)-(iii) (2009).
14. Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of
Interest in the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 25152 (2003) [hereinafter Bushwhacking].
15. Id. at 252.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Screening is a term used to signify barriers created inside
a law firm to isolate a conflicted attorney from the rest of the
firm.18 The procedure allows a different attorney in the law
firm to represent a client even though another attorney in the
same firm is disqualified due to a conflict of interest.19 The
primary goal of screening is to make sure that confidential
information in the possession of the disqualified attorney
remains protected.20 A private attorney moving laterally from
one firm to another inevitably brings confidential information
and potential conflicts. Allowing screening as an alternative to
imputed disqualification of the entire firm gives clients more
freedom to choose attorneys, allows lawyers greater flexibility
in moving among employment situations, and permits law
firms to hire experienced attorneys without the risk of imputed
conflicts.21
The ABA defines “screened” as the “isolation of a lawyer
from any participation in a matter through the timely
imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably
adequate under the circumstances to protect information that
the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or
other law.”22 The Comments to Rule 1.0 set forth additional
information and guidelines as to what the law firm should do to
effectively screen a lawyer. The Comment states that in order
to insure client confidentiality:
[t]he personally disqualified lawyer should
acknowledge the obligation not to communicate
with any of the other lawyers in the firm with
respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in
the firm who are working on the matter should
be informed that the screening is in place and
that they may not communicate with the
personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the
matter. . . . To implement, reinforce and remind
all affected lawyers of the presence of the
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Brocker, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.0(k) (2009).
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screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to
undertake such procedures as a written
undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any
communication with other firm personnel and
any contact with any firm files or other materials
relating to the matter, . . . denial of access by the
screened lawyer to firm files or other materials
relating to the matter and periodic reminders of
the screen to the screened lawyer and all other
firm personnel.
In order to be effective, screening measures
must be implemented as soon as practical after a
lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should
know that there is a need for screening.23
Although the amended Rule is not restricted to certain
situations in lateral moves,24 the Rule does set forth “stringent
requirements” that must be followed in order for the screen to
be effective and the imputation of conflicts avoided.25 One half
of the states with screening provisions in place have “limited”
screens where the use of screening is not allowed in situations
when the disqualified attorney had a “substantial role” in the
former matter or when the present matter is “substantially
related” to the former matter.26 In contrast, New York Rule
1.10 does not allow for any non-consensual screening for
laterally moving lawyers.27
It seems ironic that New York State, having the largest
population of attorneys (over 153,000),28 took twenty-six years
23. Id. R. 1.0 cmts. 9-10 (2009).
24. In August of 2009, the ABA amended Rule 1.10 to clarify the
language of the Rule explicitly stating that non-consensual screening is only
applicable in situations where a lawyer moves from one firm to another.
ROBERT MUNDHEIM, A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, REP.
TO
THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION
109
(2009),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/revision_to_rule_1_10.doc.
25. Melton, Imputation of Conflicts, supra note 5.
26. STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY D. SIMON & ANDREW M. PERLMAN, REGULATION
OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 147-51 (2009).
27. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c)-(d) (2010).
28. A.B.A. MKT. RES. DEP‟T, NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE
(2009),
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to get in line with the rest of the country and adopt the Model
Rules, effective April 1, 2009.29 After taking a close look at New
York‟s new Rules, it is nothing short of shocking that
approximately “three-quarters of the new rules embody” the
then current state code.30 Unfortunately, New York‟s Rule 1.10
does not allow for screening of a laterally moving lawyer; it
states that an attorney‟s new firm may not represent a client in
the same or substantially related matter in which the lawyer or
lawyer‟s prior firm represented the client, unless the individual
did not acquire any information protected under Rule 1.6 or
Rule 1.9 that is material to the matter.31 The rule does provide
that the conflict can be waived by the former client under the
conditions stated in Rule 1.7.32 Under this New York Rule, the
use of screening to avoid imputed disqualification of laterally
moving attorneys is not allowed. Although adoption of the
Model Rules format is a step in the right direction, “there is
still work to be done.”33
III. Attorney vs. Client—Is this the Real Conflict of
Interest?
The duty of confidentiality owed to current, former, and
potential clients has no “statute of limitations”; it continues
long after the lawyer-client relationship has ended.34 This duty
http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/2009_NATL_LAWY
ER _by_State.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION].
29. Joel Stashenko, N.Y. Adopts New Conduct Rules Aligned with ABA
Model,
N.Y.L.J.,
Dec.
17,
2008,
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202426814836
[hereinafter New Conduct Rules].
30. Id.
31. N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (2010). Rule 1.6 protects
the confidentiality of all information relating to the representation of the
client and Rule 1.9 extends that duty to former clients and also states that a
lawyer shall not use the confidential information to the disadvantage of the
former client. Id. RR. 1.6, 1.9.
32. Id. R. 1.10(d). Rule 1.7 allows representation with the existence of a
conflict if: (1) the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation, (2) it is not prohibited by law, (3) it does not involve one client
asserting a claim against another client, and (4) each affected client must
give informed consent. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4).
33. New Conduct Rules, supra note 29.
34. Bushwhacking, supra note 14, at 107.
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produces a long list of clients whose interests must be weighed
in a conflict of interest analysis, including many that are
“remote, unlikely, or [even] forgotten.”35 The more clients that
law firms owe fiduciary responsibilities to, the greater the
likelihood of conflicts, thus creating a severe risk for large
firms.36 “As lawyers navigate through the job market . . . from
firm to firm, they accumulate weightier and weightier baggage
that collects duties owed to each cohort of former and current
clients they encounter.”37 Under imputed disqualification rules,
migratory lawyers become so-called “Typhoid Marys,
conflicting out thousands of their colleagues and forcing their
new firms to turn away a substantial amount of prospective
business” due to their prior affiliations.38
Perhaps the biggest fear of those in opposition of lateral
non-consensual screening is that it endorses “side switching,”
allowing a lawyer who has represented a party on one side of
litigation to then represent the opposing side by moving to a
new firm.39 It is often argued that, before the screening
amendment, clients had the security in knowing that a “sideswitching” lawyer and that attorney‟s new firm would be
prevented from representing the other side if the former client
withheld consent.40 This argument really focuses on clients‟
fear that attorneys are putting their own interests before those
of their clients. The opposition argues that the fiduciary duties
of loyalty and confidentiality are the “heart of the lawyer-client
relationship” and the imputation of conflicts protects clients,
which is the very purpose of the Model Rules.41
The arguments criticizing screening as allowing “side35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 108.
38. Id. at 156.
39. STEVEN C. KRANE, A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY,
REP. (2008), http://www.aprl.net/pdf/SCEPR_Report.pdf.
40. See Susan R. Martyn & James M. McCauley, Minority Report, in
A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, REP. TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES:
RECOMMENDATION
109,
at
16
(2009),
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/109.pdf.
41. Robert Rothman, Rule 1.10 Report, in A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS &
PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY, REP. TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION
110,
at
2
(2009),
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/110.pdf.
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switching” are misguided, as is the false and misleading choice
of whether to protect the client‟s interest of confidentiality or
the personal interests of the lawyer. “Screening is a mechanism
to give effect to the duty of confidentiality, not a tool to
undermine it.”42 “Side switching” is not an issue with screening
since the disqualified lawyer may never represent the opposing
party by changing firms.43 Furthermore, “[t]he point of
screening is to isolate that lawyer from participation in or
communications about the matter, underscoring that the
transferring lawyer is disqualified from „switching sides.‟”44
A study of lawyers and law firms in Illinois, a jurisdiction
that allows for lateral screening of private attorneys, revealed
that law firms were not overwhelmed with screens.45 The
screens are “constructed most frequently where they are most
appropriate—in large law firms where conflicts are more
common and confidentiality easier to cloister, especially where
conflicts span physical, social, or geographic distance within
the firm.”46 Although Illinois does not require client consent to
screening, lawyers have reported that they are unlikely to use
screening if it would not satisfy clients‟ expectations of
undivided loyalty.47 Screening does not allow lawyers to
undertake adverse representations; many times migratory
lawyers must leave behind significant clients whose interests
are adverse to those of the new firm.48
Under a rule requiring consent, such as New York‟s, the
client of the former firm holds the “sword of an absolute veto
over his adversary‟s choice of law firm, simply by withholding
consent, often solely for unfair tactical advantage without any

42. Robert H. Mundheim, Report, in ADOPTED RECOMMENDATION 109, at
11
(2009),
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/daily_journal/Adopted109.do
c.
43. Id. at 13.
44. Id. The purpose of the screening amendment “is to avoid imputed
disqualification of all the other lawyers in the new firm, lawyers who have
not changed sides at all.” Id.
45. Bushwhacking, supra note 14, at 160.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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substantive basis in fairness.”49 This type of rule “presumes the
likelihood of lawyer dishonesty or negligence in violating a
screen,” which reflects poorly on the legal profession and
undermines the confidence and trust that lawyers strive to
gain in the public eye.50 Although the interest of client
confidentiality must be protected, doing so should not require a
ban on the lawyer‟s mobility unless the client‟s consent is
received.51 One important consideration is that former clients
have no incentive to consenting, nor do they have any
obligation not to withhold consent unreasonably.52 It follows
that consent is rarely ever given under this system, although,
when the screening judgment is left up to the attorney, as is
the case in Illinois, screens are likely to be employed only in
the appropriate situations. These restrictions on mobility affect
not only the laterally moving lawyer, but also the interests of
other clients in being represented by the attorney of their
choice.53
Recently, the ABA issued Formal Opinion 09-455, which
discusses the issue of maintaining client confidentiality and
disclosure related to conflict checking for lateral moves.54 The
ABA quickly responded to concerns that the information a firm
will need a laterally moving attorney to disclose, in order to
complete a conflicts check, is protected from being disclosed
under Rule 1.6(a).55 This opinion clarifies that while not
explicitly stated in the Rules, disclosure of conflicts information
during a lateral move is ordinarily permissible, subject to
limitations.56 The opinion states that any disclosure should be
“no greater than reasonably necessary” and “must not
49. E. NORMAN VEASEY, A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L
RESPONSIBILITY, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO MODEL RULE 1.10 IS BALANCED
AND IMPORTANT; THE ARGUMENTS OF THE OPPONENTS ARE STALE AND HOLLOW 12 (2009), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/veasey.pdf.
50. Id. at 1.
51. Mundheim, supra note 42, at 11.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-455
(2009) (discussing disclosure of Conflicts Information when Lawyers Move
Between Firms).
55. See id.
56. Id.
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compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice
a client or former client[,] . . . [nor be used] for purposes other
than detecting and resolving conflicts of interest. Disclosure
normally should not occur until . . . substantive discussions”
have taken place between the lawyer and the new firm.57 The
opinion states that the rationale behind this opinion is to
protect lawyer mobility and the clients‟ choice of legal counsel
after a change of association.58
IV. New York Rules Allow Screening in Multiple
Places
Screening is not a stranger to the New York Rules, as it is
currently allowed in three different situations: under Rule 1.11
for government attorneys, under Rule 1.12 for judges,
mediators, and non-lawyers, and under Rule 1.18 when dealing
with prospective clients.59 One argument for allowing screening
of laterally moving attorneys is that government attorneys can
be screened when they move into private practice. However,
criticisms have been raised concerning the question of why
screening is allowed to protect the mobility of government
lawyers, but then is not allowed to protect the livelihood of
private lawyers.60 “Handicapping the ethics rules to encourage
or favor one type of practice, however noble, is simply unfair.”61
It has never been said that government lawyers are more
ethical or trustworthy than private lawyers; therefore, if
government lawyers can be trusted to comply with the
screening regulations, then private lawyers should be trusted
as well.62
Rule 1.11, which addresses government attorneys, is the
only Rule that provides an explanation for allowing screening,
stating that the provisions are “necessary to prevent the
disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent to
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT RR. 1.11, 1.12, 1.18 (2010).
60. See ROBERT A. CREAMER, LATERAL SCREENING AFTER ETHICS 2000
(2009), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/screen-ethics.pdf.
61. Id. at 9.
62. Id. at 10.
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entering public service.”63 Under Rule 1.12, judges, mediators,
arbitrators, and law clerks can be screened to avoid
disqualification, but there is no rationale provided in the
comments.64 Also, under Rule 1.18, lawyers who learn
confidential information from a prospective client can be
effectively screened to avoid imputation of conflict of interests
to the entire firm and, again, no rationale is given for allowing
screening in this circumstance.65 This Rule did not exist under
the New York Code and was only recently adopted under the
implementation of the Model Rules in April 2009. In adopting
Rule 1.18, New York recognized the duty of confidentiality
owed to perspective clients, realized the threat of potential
conflicts that would be created, and mitigated this risk by
allowing screening.66 The adoption of Rule 1.10, allowing for
screening of laterally moving lawyers, would be a logical
progression from here.
Many critics are further bothered by New York‟s use of
selective screening, as stated in the Comments under Rule
1.10, to avoid imputation of conflicts from non-lawyers,
specifically paralegals, legal secretaries, and law student
interns.67 To discriminate between laterally moving private
lawyers and non-lawyers is illogical.68 Why would a state allow
non-lawyer employees to be screened to avoid imputation when
they are under no personal professional duty to protect
confidential client information and, at the same time, not allow
screening of lawyers who are subject to these professional
duties and who can be held personally responsible for their
breach?69 To further complicate the situation, Rule 6.5 exempts
“Limited Pro Bono Legal Services Programs” from Rule 1.10
altogether, realizing that imputed conflicts can be a serious
issue for many lawyers, but choosing to eradicate the problem
for those serving in a pro bono program.70 New York will not
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.11 cmt. 4 (2010).
Id. R. 1.12.
Id. R. 1.18.
See id.
See id. R. 1.10 cmt. 4.
CREAMER, supra note 65, at 10.
See id.
N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 6.5 (2010). Rule 6.5 states that a
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allow screening of lateral moving private attorneys, yet the
state has granted exemptions for pro bono programs and made
exceptions to protect government lawyers, judges, arbitrators,
mediators, paralegals, law clerks, law secretaries, and lawyers
when dealing with prospective clients. Conflicts of interest will
arise at some point in every lawyer‟s career; it is not fair or just
to protect only certain categories through exemptions or
exceptions to screening, while not protecting others.
V. Effective Screening and Disqualification
A. Evolution of Screening in the Courts
More than fifty years ago, Judge Weinfeld announced the
“substantially related” standard for successive representation,
which required the disqualification of an attorney even though
it was not shown that the attorney was privy to the former
client‟s confidences.71 Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) codified
imputation of the disqualification to all of the lawyers affiliated
with the disqualified lawyer.72 This Rule operated under the
assumption that lawyers shared their client‟s confidential
information with all of the other attorneys in the firm.73
Perhaps this idea may have been more realistic when law firms
were small and less specialized, but after concerns about
lawyer mobility and the clients‟ right to an attorney of their
choice, courts created a rebuttable presumption of imputed
knowledge to avoid firm-wide disqualification in all cases.74
lawyer “shall comply with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer has actual knowledge
at the time of commencement of representation that another lawyer
associated with the lawyer in the law firm is affected by Rules 1.7, 1.8 and
1.9.” Id. R. 6.5(a)(2).
71. See T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp.
265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
72. MODEL CODE OF PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1980).
73. See The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U.
PA. L. REV. 677, 682 (1980) [hereinafter Chinese Wall Defense].
74. See generally Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that “it would be absurd to
conclude that immediately upon their entry on duty [associates of large law
firms] become the recipients of knowledge as to the names of all the firm‟s
clients, the contents of all files relating to such clients, and all confidential
disclosures by client officers or employees to any lawyer in the firm.”).
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After the rebuttable presumption of imputed knowledge
was accepted, the idea of using screening to avoid firm-wide
disqualification began to have meaning.75 In 1975, the ABA
Ethics Committee issued Formal Opinion 34276 endorsing the
use of screening out of concern that inflexible application of
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) would “unduly limit the
employment opportunities of government attorneys upon
leaving government service and impair the ability of
government to recruit talented young professionals.”77 At that
time, screening was not yet widely accepted because the thencurrent Code of Conduct required lawyers to avoid even the
appearance of impropriety under Canon 9.78
The firm disqualification rule was perceived as serving
dual purposes, preventing actual impropriety and also avoiding
even the appearance of impropriety.79 “Only the first of these
may fairly be characterized as ethical; the second is more of a
matter of public policy.”80 Under this perception, when no
actual impropriety existed, the firm could still be disqualified
to avoid the appearance of impropriety as a matter of public
policy.81 The idea of disqualification based on public policy left
open the question of countervailing public policies such as
lawyer mobility and a clients‟ right to their choice of lawyer.
This argument became stronger when the ABA moved away
from the Code and its appearance of impropriety standard, and
adopted the Model Rules in 1983.82 Shortly thereafter, the
Seventh Circuit decided the seminal case on the use of lateral
screening in private practice.

75. See Chinese Wall Defense, supra note 78, at 684.
76. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975).
77. Chinese Wall Defense, supra note 78, at 692.
78. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‟L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980).
79. Chinese Wall Defense, supra note 78, at 702.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See
generally
About
the
Model
Rules,
A.B.A.,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html (last visited Sept. 15,
2010).
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B. Judicial Interpretation of the Effectiveness of Screening
In 1983, in Schiessle v. Stephens, the Seventh Circuit
approved the idea of lateral screening in private practice and
set forth an influential three-step test.83 The first two steps of
the test determine whether an individual lawyer is disqualified
from representation and the third step determines whether a
disqualification will be imputed to the lawyer‟s new firm.84 The
first step asks whether or not the subject matter of the prior
representation and the subject matter of the present
representation are substantially related; if so, the second step
asks whether the presumption of shared confidences has been
rebutted with respect to the prior representation.85 Finally, the
third step asks whether the presumption of shared confidences
has been rebutted with respect to the present representation.86
“After Schiessle, many other federal courts have endorsed the
use of screening to rebut the presumption of shared confidences
when a lawyer switches from one private firm to another.”87
While some state courts refuse to recognize screening as a
mechanism to avoid imputed conflicts, some have adopted the
three-part Schiessle test while others have taken an
intermediate approach that allows for screening only under
certain situations.88 New York case law falls under the latter
category. Kassis v. Teacher’s Ins. & Annuity Ass’n is cited most
often for finding screening effective to avoid imputed
disqualification.89 In Kassis, the New York Court of Appeals
refused to grant a motion to disqualify a laterally moving
attorney that was previously a first-year associate at another
83. 717 F.2d 417, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1983).
84. Conflicts of Interest; Imputed Disqualification, 51 ABA/BNA LAW.
MANUAL ON PROF‟L CONDUCT 2001 (2004) [hereinafter Conflicts of Interest].
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. The fact that the federal courts do “articulate a vision of proper
lawyering when they define the outer limits of an attorney‟s conduct under
federal law, procedure, or rules of evidence” which have an important impact
on state courts only further frustrates the goal of uniformity. Judith A.
McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959,
970 (1991).
88. McMorrow, supra note 92.
89. 717 N.E.2d 674 (N.Y. 1999).
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firm.90 The court held that it would provide a tactical
advantage to Kassis if Teacher‟s Insurance would incur
significant financial hardship in retaining new counsel, and
that the “Chinese Wall”91 that the new firm had erected was
effective in screening the new attorney from any participation
or discussions on the matter.92 The court stated that:
[a] “per se rule of disqualification . . . is
unnecessarily preclusive because it disqualifies
all members of a law firm indiscriminately,
whether or not they share knowledge of [the]
former client‟s confidences and secrets . . . .”
[B]ecause disqualification of a law firm during
litigation may have significant adverse
consequences to the client and others, “it is
particularly important that the Code of
Professional Responsibility not be mechanically
applied . . . .”93
Again in 2004, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York approved of a law firm‟s use of screening.94 Even
though a lawyer at Frommer Lawrence & Haug had worked at
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy as an associate three years
earlier, and was listed as a recipient on e-mails regarding the
present matter, the court held that disqualification was not
required due to its use of an effective screen.95 More recently, in
a situation involving a merger of firms, a district court judge in

90. Id.
91. The term “Chinese Wall” has not found favor among the legal
community and is no longer widely accepted and used today due to criticisms
of racial discrimination. See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court,
245 Cal. Rptr. 873, 887-88 (Ct. App. 1988) (Low, J., concurring). Terms used
more often are ethical “screen” or “barrier of silence.” Id.
92. See Kassis, 717 N.E.2d 674.
93. Id. at 677 (citations omitted).
94. See Papyrus Tech. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d
270, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
95. Id. The court analyzed this case under Kassis, the leading case on
screening, finding no indication that the lawyer had received material
information regarding the present case and that the screen was effective. Id.
at 278-79.
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the Eastern District of New York denied a motion to disqualify
an entire firm on the basis that one of its attorneys had became
disqualified because of the merger.96 The lawyer in IntelliCheck had worked on a case while at the plaintiff‟s firm,
Gibbons DelDeo, which he later left to join the firm of Kelley
Drye, which was not involved with the case.97 Two years later,
Kelley Drye merged with Collier Shannon, which represented
the defendants, and the plaintiff moved for disqualification of
the entire firm.98 The court denied the motion, finding that
shortly after the merger, an effective screen was erected
around the lawyer.99 The court noted that it was influenced by
the fact that the conflicted lawyer was located in Kelley Drye‟s
New York City office, while the litigation team representing
the defendants was located in Washington, D.C.100 The New
York courts have repeatedly used their discretion to approve of
the use of screening, and thereby have avoided the harsh
remedy of imputed disqualification, in the appropriate
situations.
C. Disqualification Still an Available Remedy
With the formulation and efficacy of a screen varying from
firm to firm, courts will ultimately have to exercise their
“inherent power to rule on a motion to disqualify.”101 “[C]ourts
often consult the Model Rules and local rules for guidance, thus
heightening the importance of devising standards that provide
direction to attorneys as they seek to comply with their ethical
responsibilities.”102 “Both the Rules and the courts have a role
in preserving confidence in the integrity of the [legal]
96. Intelli-Check, Inc. v. TriCom Card Techs., Inc., No. 03 CV 3706 (DLI)
(ETB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84435 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008).
97. Id. at *2-3.
98. Id. at *1-3.
99. Id. at *16.
100. Id. at *8. The plaintiff argued that the lawyer‟s work was
significant or “appreciable” and therefore screening should not be effective
under Kassis. Id. at *14. The court refused to accept this argument stating
that it was not going to pay attention to such labels. Id. at *15.
101. Erik Wittman, A Discussion of Nonconsensual Screens as the ABA
Votes to Amend Model Rule 1.10, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1211, 1221 (2009).
102. Id.
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profession” and therefore, while the Model Rules allow
screening, they also explicitly state that a former client may
still file a motion for disqualification where the court will be
able to address their particular concerns with the
representation.103
It appears that, in effect, this is the very situation
happening in New York; it only makes sense to conform our
Rules to the modern realities of the legal profession. The
requirements of screening are not to be taken lightly and
compliance will have to be proven by the firm attempting to
avoid the imputation of disqualification should the issue be
brought before the court.104 On a motion for disqualification, a
court is likely to consider multiple factors with regard to the
screen, including: (1) the timeliness of invocation; (2) the
procedures invoked to isolate the lawyer from the matter and
all communications; (3) the time lapse between the matters in
dispute; (4) the size of the firm; and (5) the firm‟s policy against
breaches of a screen.105
New York courts have made it clear that they do not have
a problem with, and are very capable of, analyzing the use of
screens and disqualifying a law firm when it appears
necessary. In recent years, the courts have refused to disqualify
entire law firms based on a laterally moving lawyer when: 1)
she knew nothing about a certain case during her time at the
prior firm,106 2) the prior client‟s allegations of the lawyer‟s
possession of confidential information material to the
representation were conclusory,107 and 3) she was being
disqualified as part of a scheme to gain tactical advantage over
the opponent.108 It should also be noted that the courts have
103. See Mundheim, supra note 42.
104. See Conflicts of Interest, supra note 89.
105. Melton, Imputation of Conflicts, supra note 5.
106. See generally Nimkoff v. Nimkoff, 797 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 2005);
Telesco v. Bateau, 749 N.Y.S.2d 811 (App. Div. 2002).
107. See generally Med. Capital Corp. v. MRI Global Imaging, Inc., 812
N.Y.S.2d 118 (App. Div. 2006); Telesco, 749 N.Y.S.2d 811.
108. See generally Kassis v. Teacher‟s Ins. & Annuity Ass‟n, 717 N.E.2d
674 (N.Y. 1999); Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc., 470 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div.
1984). One clear example of exploiting an imputed disqualification rule to
gain tactical advantage is where law firms are known for a rare specialized
expertise, such as the merger and acquisition specialists at Skadden, Arps,
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not hesitated to disqualify firms where they have found the
screen to be ineffective109 or the firm size too small.110
The Rules must be clear for lawyers to be able to follow
them and for law firms to be able to predict the results of their
actions. In New York, there is no clear rule and the courts have
taken it upon themselves to determine when screening will or
will not be effective and when it is or is not allowed. The Rules
of Professional Conduct are supposed to be a lawyer‟s guide to
the practice of law in New York. The straight-forward “no” to
lateral screening under Rule 1.10 will hardly suffice in today‟s
economy, as is evident by the numerous court opinions and the
actions of law firms that have implemented lateral screening
on their own.
While New York‟s Rules do not allow for lateral screening
of private lawyers, courts have repeatedly ruled in favor of
screening, finding the mechanism a favorable alternative to
disqualification in situations where disqualifying the entire
firm would be extremely detrimental to the law firm and its
clients.. It is understandable that New York law firms and
lawyers have received unclear messages about the use of
screening; the Rules were adopted without a screening
provision, yet the courts seem to be allowing screening in
certain situations.111 It would be in the legal profession‟s best
Slate, Meagher & Flom. See Bushwhacking, supra note 14, at 114. When
corporate executives feared that they may become potential takeover targets,
they immunized themselves from a possible attack by a Skadden Arps client
by giving the firm business and “thereby creating a direct adversity between
their company and any potential client that might engage the firm to go after
them.” Id.
109. See generally Panebianco v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 04 Civ.
9331 (JSR), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7314 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2005).
110. See generally Young v. Cent. Square Cent. Sch. Dist., 213 F. Supp.
2d 202 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); Mitchell v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 01 Civ. 2112
(WHP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4675 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2002); Decora, Inc. v.
DW Wallcovering, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
111. “This lack of uniformity and clear distrust of lawyers‟ abilities to
construct and respect screens directly conflicts with the goals and principles
as stated in the ABA Model Rules. It is . . . these actions which undermine
the integrity of the profession.” Erin A. Cohn, The Use of Screens to Cure
Imputed Conflicts of Interest: Why the American Bar Association’s and Most
State Bar Associations’ Failure to Allow Screening Undermines the Integrity
of the Legal Profession, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 367, 393 (2006) [hereinafter Cohn,
Use of Screens].
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interest if everyone were reading from the same page, ideally,
of the New York Rules. If New York were to set forth a detailed
screening provision in its Rules, law firms would know what to
expect when confronting a situation involving a lateral private
move and potential conflicts, and courts would also have
guidelines to use in allowing screening as an alternative to
imputed disqualification.
VI. Self Regulation and Uniform Standards
The legal profession prides itself on being wholly selfregulated. Indeed, self-regulation “is at the core of a viable
legal profession.”112 It appears that the “privilege of self
regulation could so easily drift towards the view that it is but
an option, one that can be easily removed if not treated with
the serious sense of purpose it deserves.”113 But query whether
today‟s legal profession is wholly self-regulated. There has been
much criticism on this issue and some argue that the ABA‟s
Model Rules are “no longer . . . sufficient to foreclose other
regulation . . . .”114
It seems likely that uniformity among state ethics rules
would strengthen the idea of self regulation. States that adopt
the Model Rules have the benefit of common experience and
persuasive authority through multiple sources. This includes
opinions from other state courts, formal and informal opinions
on the meaning and application of the Rules issued by the
ABA‟s Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, where the
influence of the Model Rules is “heavy and readily apparent.”115
112. Charles B. Plattsmier, Self Regulation and the Duty to Report
Misconduct: Myth or Mainstay?, 2007 PROF. LAW. 41, 45.
113. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
114. Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1147, 1171 (2009) (arguing that “[a] variety of regulators external to the
ABA—including the courts—interpret, adjust, and enforce the rules and
provide their own regulations when the prevailing professional code seems
inadequate”).
115. Gregory C. Sisk, Iowa’s Legal Ethics Rules - It’s Time to Join the
Crowd, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 279, 290 (1999). The Restatement was not designed
to track any particular set of ethics rules but rather to “reflect the informed
and deliberate consensus of the profession on professional conduct.” Id.
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Uniform ethics standards would also be beneficial to lawyers
that engage in multi-jurisdictional practice by allowing them
the benefit of familiar rules. These benefits will not be shared
in a state which adopts the Model Rules in format, though not
in substance, as was done in New York.
It seems that the legal profession is moving towards a
trend of national ethics standards. Today, all American law
schools that are accredited by the ABA “shall require that each
student receive substantial instruction in . . . the history, goals,
structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal
profession and its members.”116 This includes “instruction in
matters such as the law of lawyering and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association.”117 If
our law schools operate under a national accreditation system
which mandates that every student receive substantial
education under the Model Rules, it seems illogical and
inefficient for a state to implement rules any different from
those which every lawyer who attended an ABA accredited law
school is familiar with.
Furthermore, as a condition for admission to the bar in all
but four U.S. jurisdictions, applicants must pass the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE).118 The
purpose of the MPRE is to “measure the examinee‟s knowledge
and understanding of established standards related to a
lawyer‟s professional conduct.”119 The examination tests on the
law governing the conduct of lawyers and “is based on the
disciplinary rules of professional conduct currently articulated
in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .”120
Therefore, not only are law students subjected to substantial
instruction based on the Model Rules, but they are also
examined on the Model Rules as a condition to gain admittance
116. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A.B.A., 2009-2010
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 302(a)(5),
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/20092010%20StandardsWebContent/Chapter3 .pdf.
117. Id. at Interpretation 302-9.
118. Description of the MPRE, NAT‟L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM‟RS,
http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/mpre-faqs/description0/
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2010).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id.
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to the bar. The benefits of adopting rules in unison with the
Model Rules are twofold; it saves resources for the state by
eliminating the need to promulgate its own Rules, and it
furthers the goals of self regulation of the legal profession when
attorneys are educated on and proficient with the Rules.
VII. Recommendation
New York has more attorneys than any other state.121 It
should follow that the ethics rules for the state‟s legal
profession would serve as a guide to other states, but
unfortunately this is not the case. In an attempt to modernize
the ethics rules, New York has taken a step in the right
direction by adopting the Model Rules format, but it did not go
far enough. New York should follow the example set forth in
the Model Rules and allow lateral screening without
limitations under Rule 1.10.
Experience has shown that, even without limitations,
screening has not been problematic in states that allow it and
the courts have had no hesitation exercising their power in
deciding on motions to disqualify.122 It does not make sense to
forego a favorable alternative to firm-wide imputed
disqualification when there is no showing that screening can
not or should not be used in the appropriate situations. As seen
through the survey of Illinois lawyers, screens are not being
abused; they are being used in the appropriate situations.123
Even when appropriate, firms will weigh the price of bringing
on a new attorney with that of losing a client if the client is
likely to disapprove of the screen.124
Many states that have adopted rules allowing screening of
lateral attorneys have further explained the rule and how it
should be implemented, most commonly in the definitions

121. NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION, supra note 28.
122. Robert H. Mundheim, Report, in A.B.A. COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF‟L
RESPONSIBILITY, REP. TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 109, at
4-10
(2009),
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/109.pdf.
123. See Bushwhacking, supra note 14, at 160.
124. Id.
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section and also in the Comments to the rule.125 One addition
that should be adopted, in hopes to win favor among those in
opposition, is a requirement that firms implement their own
policy against breaches of the screen.126 The rule should go a
step further, stating the wisdom of explicitly providing for
imposition of court ordered sanctions where appropriate.127 A
strong firm-wide policy against breaches will serve as a
deterrent to violating a screen and, when coupled with the
threat of sanctions, should prove sufficient in controlling the
use of screens and ensuring that client confidentiality is
protected.
To make screening as effective as possible, New York
should include in its Rule notice that implementation of the
screen must be “timely.” Logically, the next step would be to
define what will suffice as “timely.” There is no uniformity
among the courts on this issue. Some courts have held that, in
order for a screen to be effective, it must be implemented at the
time the new attorney joins the firm.128 Recently in New York,
a district court held that, even though a lateral lawyer knew of
a conflict and did not disclose it, a screen implemented two
days after opposing counsel demanded the firm withdraw from
representation was considered “timely.”129 Although the Intelli
court‟s method, which weighed the interests of both parties
involved,130 is a sound approach to conflicts, a much stronger
approach would be to provide a clear guideline in the Rules
which would allow lawyers to mold their behavior accordingly.
Thus, Rule 1.10 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct
should contain a provision allowing for timely screening of
laterally moving attorneys, a requirement for a strong firm
policy against breaches, and the threat of court ordered
sanctions, to sufficiently protect both the interest of the
attorney in mobility and the client in maintaining
125. See, e.g., N.C. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT RR. 1.0(l) cmt. 9-10 & 1.10
cmt. 7-8 (2003).
126. See generally Wittman, supra note 106, 1224-25.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 1225-26.
129. Intelli-Check, Inc. v. TriCom Card Techs., Inc., No. 03 CV 3706
(DLI) (ETB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84435, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008).
130. See id. at *18.
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confidentiality.
VIII. Conclusion
“In a profession there should be certain ethical rules from
which no derogation is allowed, and professionals in a position
to create and amend these rules should strive for
uniformity.”131 By not allowing lateral screening of private
attorneys, New York is effectively saying that its private
attorneys cannot be trusted. Although adopting the Model
Rules in New York was one step towards modernization and
uniformity, the movement has not come far enough. The
substantive Rules are more important than their format and
New York should aim to tailor its Rules as closely to the Model
Rules as possible to take advantage of the benefits that come
with uniformity. With more attorneys than any other state,132
New York should be a leader in the profession, protecting
clients and attorneys with rules modeled to reflect current
issues being experienced in practice.
We have all recently learned that the legal profession is
not recession proof and New Yorkers know very well the tough
job market that exists today. As a self-regulated profession, it
is unacceptable that we are hindering our own lawyers from
landing new jobs through the risk of firm-wide imputed
disqualification created under our Rules.133 Knowing this, New
York must reconsider Rule 1.10 in light of the recent steps
towards modernizing the Rules of Conduct for the legal
profession. Uniformity and consistency among the Rules
encourages ethical behavior by ensuring that attorneys are
educated and familiar with them. If New York wants its Rules
to be worth their weight in paper, it must correlate with how
the State‟s courts are ruling in light of this issue and how the
situations addressed are playing out in the legal profession
today.
131. Cohn, Use of Screens, supra note 116, at 392.
132. NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION, supra note 28.
133. See generally N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c)-(d) (2010);
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE; TABLE A-11:
UNEMPLOYED
PERSONS
BY
INDUSTRY
AND
CLASS
OF
WORKER,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t11.htm (last modified Oct. 8, 2010).
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